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Rights  and Their Critics
Cass R  Sunstein
The  Bill  of  Rights  has  now  been  part  of  the  United  States
Constitution for more than  two  hundred years.  In the  recent  past,
that short  document  has  inspired  reform  movements  throughout
the  world-not  merely  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Hungary,  Romania,
Poland,  and  East  Germany,  but  in  such  places  as  South  Africa,
China, and Taiwan  as well.  It is  therefore  nothing short of remark-
able  that the  international  interest in  the  Bill  of Rights  has  come
at a time when  the  very concept  of rights,  or  of a  polity pervaded
by rights,  is under attack in  the United  States.
The  attack on rights  has  sometimes  been  highly  influential.  It
underlies  a prominent new journal,  The Responsive  Community, and
it cuts  across ideological  lines.' Justice  Clarence  Thomas  has  deliv-
ered  a  passionate  and  widely  reported  plea  for  responsibilities
instead  of rights.'  In  so  saying, Justice  Thomas  echoed  a  general
*  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Distinguished  Service  Professor  of Jurisprudence  and  Co-Director
of  the  Center  on  Constitutionalism  in  Eastern  Europe,  University  of Chicago  Law  School
and  Department of Political  Science.  Some  parts  of this  essay  originally appeared  in  Cass
R.  Sunstein,  Rightalk, NEW  REPUBLIC,  Sept.  2,  1991,  at  33  (reviewing  MARY  ANN  GLENDON,
RIGHTS  TALK:  THE  IMPOVERISHMENT  OF  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE  (1991)).
1  See,  e.g.,  AM1TAI  ETZIONI,  THE  SPIRIT  OF  COMMUNrI:  RIGHTS,  RESPONSIBILITIES,  AND
THE  COMMUNITARIAN  AGENDA  (1993);  MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  RIGHTS  TALK:  THE  IMPOVERISH-
MENT  OF  POLITICAL  DISCOURSE  (1991);  PHILIP  K.  HOwARD,  THE  DEATH  OF  COMMON
SENSE:  How  LAW  Is  SUFFOCATING  AMERICA  (1994);  DUNCAN  KENNEDY,  SEXY  DRESSING  ETC.
(1993);  Mark  Tushnet, An Essay  on Rights, 62 TEX.  L.  REV.  1363  (1984).  Various  challeng-
es  to  rights  can  be  found  in  the journal  founded  by  Professor  Etzioni,  THE  RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY.  See,  e.g.,  The  Responsive  Communitarian Platform: Rights  and Responsibilities, RE-
SPONSIVE  COMMUNITY,  Winter  1991/92,  at 4,  18-20  (listing 57  signatories  to  the  platform).
Something  with  parallel  concern,  I  believe,  underlies  RICHARD  D.  PARKER,  "HERE,  THE
PEOPLE  RULE":  A  CONSTITUTIONAL  POPULIST  MANIFESTO  (1994),  and also  CHRISTINA  HOFF
SOMMERS,  WHO  STOLE  FEMINISM?  HOW  WOMEN  HAVE  BETRAYED  WOMEN  (1994).  A  helpful
recent  discussion  can  be  found  in  Linda  C.  McClain,  Rights and Irresponsibility, 43  DUKE
LJ.  989  (1994).
2  Justice  Clarence  Thomas,  The  Rights  Revolution  and  America's  Urban  Poor  Vic-NOTRE  DAME  LAW REVIEW
claim  about  the  pathologies  of legal  practices  during  the  Warren
Court  era.  More  generally,  it is  urged  that  a  culture  of rights  en-
courages a form of selfishness  and  an unwillingness  to compromise
that  are  incompatible  with  citizenship.'  Along  related  but  distinct
lines, academic  critics  have suggested  that aggressive judicial review
or perhaps judicial  review  itself,  protecting  identified  rights,  is  by
its nature  incompatible  with  democracy.4
These  various  claims  have  received  hospitable  receptions  in
prominent  places.  Many  of the  Supreme  Court's  recent  decisions
embrace  the  idea  that  the  creation  of rights  can  be destructive  to
democratic  governance.5  The  attack  on  "substantive  due  process"
reflects  this  claim  quite  vividly.'  In  recent  deliberations,  Congress
and  the  executive  branch  have  been  increasingly  attentive  to  the
view  that  government,  instead  of  recognizing  rights,  should  en-
courage  people  to  exercise  greater  responsibility.7  On  this  view,
those  who  are  disadvantaged  should  take  their  welfare  into  their
own  hands  and  should  not  expect  assistance  from  government
operating  in response  to claims  of right.  Moreover, it is said,  those
who are  advantaged  should respond not to rights laid down by  the
state, but to their  own  sense  of responsibility  to  people in need.  If
the  1960s  and the  early  1970s were an  era of rights, it seems  likely
that  the  1990s  will  be  a  period  in  which  responsibilities  move
increasingly  to the fore.
tims  or  Beneficiaries?,  Address  Before  the  Federalist  Society  and  the  Manhattan  Institute
(May  16,  1994),  in 60  VITAL  SPEECHES  OF  THE  DAY  514,  514-17  (1994);  see also,  e.g.,  Neil
A.  Lewis, Justice Thomas Assails  Victim  Mentality, N.Y.  TIMES,  May  17,  1994,  at  A14.
3  See,  e.g.,  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at  1-17;  CHRISTOPHER  LASCH,  THE  REVOLT  OF
THE  MASSES  (1995).
4  See,  from  diferent  angles,  ROBERT  H.  BORK,  THE  TEMPTING  OF  AMERICA:  THE  PO-
LITICAL  SEDUCTION  OF  THE  LAW  (1990);  Mary  Becker,  Conservative Free Speech  and the  Un-
easy  Case for Judicial Review,  64  U.  COLO.  L.  REv.  975  (1993);  Jeremy  Waldron,  Freeman's
Defense  of Judicial Review,  13  LAW  &  PHIL.  27  (1994);  Jeremy  Waldron,  A  Right-Based  Cri-
tique of Constitutional Rights, 13  OXFORD J.  LEGAL  STUD.  18  (1993).
5  See,  e.g.,  Bowers  v.  Hardwick,  478  U.S.  186  (1986);  Cleburne  v.  Cleburne  Living
Ctr.,  473  U.S.  432  (1985).
6  See,  e.g.,  Bowers  v.  Hardwick,  478  U.S.  at  194-95  ("There  should  be,  therefore,
great  resistance  to  expand  the substantive  reach  of th[e  Due  Process]  Clauses,  particularly
if it requires  redefining  the  category  of rights  deemed  to  be  fundamental.  Otherwise,  the
Judiciary  necessarily  takes  to  itself further  authority  to  govern  the  country without express
constitutional  authority.").
7  See,  e.g.,  R.  SHEP  MELNICK,  BETWEEN  THE  LINES:  INTERPRETING  WELFARE  RIGHTS
274-83  (1994);  President  Bill  Clinton,  Address  Before  the  National  Baptist  Convention
(Sept.  9,  1994)  (describing  a  "crisis  of values"  and  a  "lack of  individual  responsibility");
Dan  Quayle,  The  Poverty  of Values,  Address  Before  the  Commonwealth  Club  of Califor-
nia  (Sept.  8,  1994)  ("[O]ur  public  policy  today,  unfortunately,  reflects  a  philosophy  of
rights and  entitlements  rather  than  responsibility.").
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Many  critics  of rights  observe  that American  political  debate,
especially  since  the  New  Deal,  has  come  to  center on  a bewilder-
ing  and  proliferating  array  of "rights"-that  it  has  yielded  to  a
kind of "rights revolution" involving  the courts,  Congress,  and the
President.'  These  rights,  many  of  them  quite  novel,  include  a
wide  range  of  safeguards  for  criminal  defendants;  prevention
against  the  abuse  and neglect  of children;  guarantees  to  improve
the  treatment  of the  mentally  and  physically  disabled; 9  protection
of  consumers  from  sharp  practices;  and  a  remarkable  array  of
efforts  to  safeguard  the  environment."  To  be  sure,  some  people
think  that  the  growing  list  of rights  is  an  important  or precious
social  achievement,  supplementing  a  catalog of protected  interests
started  but  hardly  finished  in  the  founding  period.  But  many
others  disagree.  They  believe  that America's  transformation  into
"the land  of rights"  has had  harmful,  even  disastrous  consequenc-
es.
12
My  goal  in  this  Essay  is  to  disaggregate  and  to  evaluate  the
claims  now  brought  against  rights.  I  suggest  that  much  of  the
attack  is  based  on  confusion  and  on  a  failure  to  make  necessary
distinctions.  The  attack  is  best  aimed  at  particular  rights,  not  at
rights  as  such.  In  its  usual  form,  it depends  on  a  misunderstand-
ing  of what  rights  are  and  of what  they  do. It  rests  on  empirical
claims  that are  hard  to  support. It offers  a  cultural  diagnosis  that
is  only  part of a  complex  picture,  for  there  has  been  no  general
shift to rights  from responsibilities.
In the end, I  claim  that the critique  of rights  has  no merit as
such, and  that the  plausible  claims  that  it contains  should be  stat-
ed  far  more  cautiously  and  narrowly.  When  so  stated,  the  claims
can be  discussed  as part of a debate  over which  rights  it is best to
have,  rather  than  as  a  debate  over  whether  rights  are  pernicious
merely by virtue  of being rights.
This  Essay  comes  in  three  parts.  Part  I  tries  to  separate  the
various  components  of the attack  on rights. Part II  identifies some
8  See  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at  4-7;  HOWARD,  supra note  1,  at  116-33;  Thomas,
supra note  2.
9  See,  e.g.,  MELNICK,  supra note  7,  at  41-51.
10  See,  e.g.,  CAS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  AFrER  THE  RIGHTS  REVOLUTION:  RECONCEVING  THE
REGULATORY  STATE  11-46  (1990).
11  See  the  various  views  catalogued  in  MELNICK,  supra  note  7.  This  way  of viewing
things  builds  on  President  Roosevelt's  plea  for a  second  bill  of  rights.  See  infra note  84
and  accompanying  text.
12  See  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at  1-17;  see also Thomas,  supra  note  2.
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truths  in  this  attack,  but shows  that  most of these  truths  are  par-
tial.  Part  III  deals  with  an  increasingly  important  question-the
relationship  between  rights  and  responsibilities.
I.  THE  CHARGES
Numerous  charges  have  been  made  against  rights,  and it will
be  useful  to  begin  by  separating  distinct  claims  that  tend  to  be
run together. We  might disaggregate  the  charges  into  six different
categories.
A.  The Social Foundations of Rights
Some  people  suggest,  as  part  of  their  critique  of  rights,  that
rights are  essentially social and  collective  in character and that the
rhetoric  of rights  obscures  this  point. 1 3  For  example,  rights  come
from  the  state  in  the  sense  that  they  depend  for  their  existence
on  collective  institutions.4  Without the  law of property,  set out by
the  collectivity,  property  rights  cannot be  secure.  Without  the  law
of contract,  saying  that  agreements  are  enforceable  under  certain
conditions,  contracts  could  not  exist  in  the  way  that  we  under-
stand them.  In  the  critics'  view,  many  claims  based  on  rights,  and
especially  claims  for  individual  rights,  tend  to  disguise  the  social
character  of rights  and  in  particular  the  need  for  collective  and
communal  support.5  The  result,  it  is  said,  is  confusion  and  an
inability  to  draw  lines  between  rights  that are  desirable  from  the
social  point of view and  rights  that are  not.
B.  The Rigidity of Rights
Other  critics  charge  that  rights  have  a strident  and  absolutist
character,  and  that  for  this  reason  they  impoverish  political  dis-
course. 6  Rights  do  not  admit  of  compromise.  They  do  not  allow
room  for  competing  considerations.  For  this  reason,  they  impair
and even  foreclose  deliberation  over complex  issues not realistical-
13  See,  e.g.,  KENNEDY,  supra note  1,  at  83-88.  The  point  emerges  from  legal  realist
work.  See  Morris  R.  Cohen,  Property and Sovereignty,  13  CORNELL  L.Q.  8  (1927);  Robert  L.
Hale,  Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly  Noncoercive State, 38  POL.  Sc.  Q. 470  (1923).
See  a  related  discussion,  from  a  different  angle,  in  JOSEPH  RAz,  THE  MORALITY  OF  FREE-
DOM  165-255  (1986).
14  The  point is  made  well,  though  hardly  as  part  of a  critique  of rights,  in  JULES  L.
COLEMAN,  RISKS  AND  WRONGS  61  (1992).
15  See,  e.g.,  KENNEDY,  supra note  1, at  83-88.
16  See,  e.g.,  GLENDON,  supra note  1, at 45-46.
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ly  soluble  by  simple  formulas.  Rights  thus  have  many  of the  de-
fects  of rules.t7  A person  claiming  a right-for example,  a  handi-
capped  person  claiming  that  all buildings  should be  accessible  to
people who use wheelchairs-may not be willing to allow a process
of balancing in which  we judge,  for example,  whether  accessibility
for  wheelchairs  really  makes  sense  in  light  of  the  relevant  costs
and benefits.  A characteristic  problem  with  rules  is  that they do
not  permit  people  to  make  individual  judgments  about  whether
following  the rules  really is  reasonable  in particular  cases.9  Rights
have  the identical  problem.
Rooted  in  nineteenth-century  ideas  of  absolute  sovereignty
over  property,  rights  are  said  to  be  ill-adapted  to what we  usually
need,  that is, a careful  discussion  of trade-offs  and competing con-
cerns. If rights  are  (in Ronald  Dworkin's  suggestive  and influential
phrase,  criticized  below)  "trumps,"20  they are  for that  very  reason
harmful  to  the  difficult  process  of accommodating  different  goals
and considerations  in  resolving such  thorny  problems  as  abortion,
the environment,  and plant closings.
C.  Indeterminacy
In  one  of his  greatest  aphorisms, Justice  Holmes  wrote  that
"[g]eneral  propositions  do  not decide  concrete  cases."2'  Rights,. of
course,  take  the form  of general propositions.  For this  reason they
are said  to be indeterminate  and  thus unhelpful.22
If we  know that there  is a right to private  property, we do not
know whether  an  occupational  safety  and  health  law  or a  law  re-
quiring  beach  access  is  permissible.  In  fact,  we  know  relatively
little.  Standing  by  itself, the  constitutional  protection  against  gov-
emnment  "takings"  tells us very  little  about how  to  handle  particu-
lar problems. This is  true of rights generally.  To say that there is  a
right  to  equal  protection  of  the  law  is  not  to  say,  for  example,
that  affirmative  action  programs  are  acceptable,  mandatory,  or
prohibited.  In  fact,  the  right  to  equal  protection  of the  law  re-
17  See,  e.g.,  HOWARD,  supra note  1,  at  116-33.
18  See  id. at  113-18.
19  See  EUGENE  BARDACH1  & ROBERT  A.  KAGAN,  GOING  BY THE  BOOK: THE  PROBLEM  OF
REGULATORY  UNREASONABLENESS  (1982).
20  RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  xi  (1977)  ("Individual  rights  are
political  trumps  held by  individuals.").
21  Lochner  v.  New York,  198 U.S.  45,  76  (1904)  (Holmes, J.,  dissenting).
22  See,  e.g.,  Tushnet,  supra  note  1, at  1371-76.
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quires  a  great  deal  of  supplemental  work  to  decide  cases.  The
right  must  be  specified  in  order  to  have  concrete  meaning.  The
specification  will  depend  on  premises  not  contained  within  the
announcement  of  the  right  itself. 3  Rights  purport  to  solve  prob-
lems,  but when  stated  abstractly-it  is  claimed-they  are  at  most
the  beginning  of a discussion.
Perhaps  the area  of free  speech  is  the  most  vivid  illustration.
Everyone  agrees  that  such a right exists;  but without  supplemental
work, we  cannot know how  to  handle  the hard  questions  raised  by
commercial  speech,  libel,  obscenity,  or  campaign  finance  restric-
tions.  A  serious  problem  with  modern  free  speech  discussions  is
that the  term  "free speech"  tends  to be  used  as  if it handled  the
hard questions  by itself. 24
D.  Excessive Individualism
A  different  objection  is  that  rights  are  unduly  individualistic
and  associated  with  highly  undesirable  characteristics,  including
selfishness  and  indifference  to  others. 25  Rights  miss  the  "dimen-
sion  of sociality;""  they  posit  selfish,  isolated  individuals  who  as-
sert  what  is  theirs,  rather  than  participating  in  communal  life.
Rights,  it  is  said,  neglect  the  moral  and  social  dimensions  of im-
portant problems.
The  important  and  contested  right of privacy,  for example,  is
said to  have  emerged  as  an  unduly individual  right,  rooted in  the
"property  paradigm"  and  loosened  from  connections  to  others.
Critics  urge  that  this  conception  of  the  issues  involved  in  the
so-called  privacy  cases  misses  crucial  aspects  of the  relevant  prob-
lems-abortion,  family  living  arrangements,  and the  asserted  right
to  die.  Such  issues  do  not  involve  simple  privacy;  they  call  up  a
range  of issues  about  networks  of relationships,  between  individu-
als  and  the  state,  between  individuals  and  families,  between  indi-
viduals  and localities.  Perhaps  the abortion  issue is  especially  prob-
lematic  when  conceived  in  terms  of  a  "right  to  privacy."  Many
people,  on  both  sides  of the  abortion  controversy,  are  uncomfort-
able  with  the  "privacy"  rhetoric.  Inattentive  to  the  unborn  or  to
23  See  Henry  Richardson,  Specifying Norms  as a  Way  to  Resolve  Concrete Ethical Problems,
19  PHIL.  &  PUB.  AFF.  306  (1990).
24  This  is  a  problem  in  NADINE  STROSSEN,  DEFENDING  PORNOGRAPHY:  FREE  SPEECH,
SEX,  AND  THE  FIGHT  FOR  WOMEN'S  RIGHTS  (1995).
25  See  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at 75,  178; Tushnet,  supra note  1.
26  See  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at 109-44.
27  See  id. at 20-25,  48-50.
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the  situation  of  mothers,  American  law  has  been  said  to  have,
perversely,  left  the pregnant woman  genuinely alone, without peo-
ple  "willing to help her either to have the abortion  she  desired, or
to keep  and raise  the  child who  was eventually  born."'
Similarly,  American  law  is  said  to  be  unequipped  even  to
describe  the harms faced by a community  destroyed by  the closing
of a  plant  employing  most  of  its  members.  These  harms  include
the loss  of a rich neighborhood life-"roots, relationships,  solidari-
ty,  sense  of place,  and  shared  memory  . . . ."'  On  the  critics'
view,  the  individualistic  character  of  recent  formulations  has  left
Americans  with  a  crucial  linguistic  and  conceptual  deficiency.
Rights  talk is  a principal  culprit.  Since  rights  are  claimed  by indi-
viduals,  it  is  said,  rights  promote  and  encourage  a  community
whose  members  think  of  social  problems  in  the  most  narrow,
self-interested  terms.
E.  Protection of Existing Distributions  and Practices
To some  critics, a key problem with  rights  is that they tend  to
be used  for what the critics  see  as  pernicious  ends. Partly because
rights  are  indeterminate  in  the  abstract,  they  can  be  used  as  an
excessively  conservative  and  antidemocratic  force,  protecting  exist-  -
ing  distributions  from  scrutiny  and  change."'  Some  people  think
that  the historical  function  of rights  has  been  to  insulate  current
practice  from  legitimate  democratic  oversight.  Thus  the  Fifth
Amendment  was  invoked  to protect  slavery  before  the  Civil  War; 31
thus  the Fourteenth Amendment  was  used  to attack  social welfare
legislation  in  the  early  part  of  this  century;, 2  thus  the  First
Amendment  is  used  to  invalidate  campaign  finance  legislation3
today.4
On  this  view,  rights  are  too  readily  invoked  in  the  service  of
goals  that are  unworthy or that  at least should  be subject  to dem-
ocratic  rather than judicial resolution.  A key problem with  rights is
28  Id. at 58.
29  Id. at  30;  see  also Joseph  W.  Singer,  The  Reliance Interest in Property, 40  STAN.  L.
REV.  611  (1988).
30  See KENNEDY,  supra note  1;  Tushnet,  supra note  1, at 1371-82;  cf J.M.  Balkin,  What
Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?,  90  MICH.  L. REV.  1966  (1992).
31  See Scott v.  Sandford,  60  U.S.  (19  How.)  393  (1857).
32  See Lochner  v. New  York,  198  U.S.  45  (1905).
33  See Buckley  v. Valeo,  424  U.S.  1  (1976).
34  For a broadside  attack on judicial  invocation  of rights, see  generally  Becker,  supra
note 4.
1995]NOTRE  DAME  LAW REVIEW
that  they  are  brought  in  the  service  of  existing  distributions  of
authority and  power.
F.  Rights Versus Responsibilities
A  final and  especially  prominent  objection  is  that the  empha-
sis  on  rights  tends  to  crowd  out  the  issue  of  responsibility.  In
American  law and  in American  public  discourse,  some  critics com-
plain,  it  is  too  rare  to  find  the  idea  that  people  owe  duties  to
each  other,  or  that  civic  virtue  is  to  be  cultivated,  prized,  and
lived.  Rights,  and  especially  new  protections  of  rights  since  the
1960s,  are  said to  be  a major problem  here.
In a  simple  formulation:  People who  insist on their  rights  too
infrequently explore  what it is right to  do. Or they become  depen-
dent on  the  official  institutions  charged  with  safeguarding  rights,
rather  than  doing  things  for  themselves.  The  controversy  over
whether  rights  turn women  or blacks  into a "dependent class"  is in
part  about  this  issue. 5  People  who  insist  that  their  status  as  vic-
tims  entitles  them  to  enforce  their  legal  rights  may  not  conceive
of themselves in  ways  that engender equality and  equal citizenship.
Thus Justice  Thomas  has  objected  to  the  "judicial revolution
in individual  rights," and  has  challenged  as  harmful  "the  idea that
our society  had  failed  to  safeguard  the interests  of minorities,  the
poor  and  other  groups;  and,  as  a  consequence,  was,  in  fact,  pri-
marily  at  fault  for  their  plight." 36  Justice  Thomas  particularly  la-
mented  the fact that "[m ]any began  questioning whether the  poor
and  minorities  could  be  blamed  for  the  crimes  they  commit-
ted." 37  In  his  view,  "[o]ur  legal  institutions  and  popular  culture
began  identifying  those  accused  of wrong  doing  as  victims  of up-
bringing  and  circumstance."'  This  was  unfortunate,  for  "[i]n  the
long  run,  a society  that abandons  personal  responsibility  will  lose
its  moral  sense.  And  it  is  the  urban  poor  whose  lives  are  being
destroyed  the  most  by  this  loss  of  moral  sense." 9  According  to
Justice  Thomas:
The  very same  ideas  that prompted  the judicial  revolution
35  See,  e.g.,  KATHERINE  ROIPHE,  THE  MORNING  AFrER:  FEAR,  SEX  AND  FEMINISM  ON
COLLEGE  CAMPUSES  (1993);  SOMMERS,  supra note  1.
36  Thomas,  supra  note  2,  at 516.
37  Id.
38  Id.
39  Id.  at 517.
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...and that circumscribed  the authority  of local  communities
to  set standards  for  decorum  and  civility  on  the  streets  or  in
the public  schools  also  made it far more difficult for the  crimi-
nal justice  system  to  hold  people  responsible  for  the  conse-
quences  of their harmful  acts."
When  black people insist on rights  and "demand  ...from  [their]
oppressors  [] more  lenient  standards  of conduct,"  they produce  a
state of dependency  worse  than slavery."
Professor  Mary  Ann  Glendon,  an  especially  prominent  and
evenhanded  critic  of  rights,  is  similarly  concerned  about  the  ef-
fects  of rights  on  responsibilities.42  Thus  Glendon  devotes  a  good
deal  of space  to  the  "duty  to  rescue,"  a  duty  not  recognized  by
American  law.43  If a person  ignores  someone  who  is  drowning,  he
will  not be  held accountable,  even  if rescue  could  occur with little
effort.  Glendon  deplores  this  result,  arguing  at a minimum  for  a
statement, in  law,  that such  a duty  exists.  On  Glendon's view,  it is
important  to  attend  to  responsibility  as  well  as  rights.  American
law does this  far too infrequently.
Along  similar  lines,  Glendon  challenges  the  view  (on  which
the  current  Supreme  Court  is  increasingly  insistent4 )  that  the
Constitution  imposes  no  affirmative  duties  on  government.  She
suggests,  though  with  some  ambivalence,  that  police  officers
should  be  obliged  to protect people from  serious  threats  and that
social workers  should  have a duty  to protect  children from  domes-
tic violence  when  they are on notice  that such violence  will  occur.
Above  all,  Glendon  fears  that judicial  decisions  that  fail  to  recog-
nize  these  duties  have  harmed  public  discourse  and  social  under-
standings. The important point  is the  general  one:  Critics  of rights
argue  that  the  emphasis  on  rights  diminishes  individual  commit-
ments  to duty and  responsibility.
II.  CONCEPTS  AND  PARTIAL  TRUTHS
In  this  section,  I  attempt  to  clarify  some  of the  conceptual
issues  at stake  in  the  critique  of rights.  I  suggest  as  well  that the
40  Id. at  516.
41  Id. at  517.
42  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at 76-108.
43  Id. at  78-89.
44  See  DeShaney  v.  Winnebago  County  Dep't  of  Social  Servs.,  489  U.S.  189,  196
(1989)  (The  Due  Process  Clause  "confers  no  affirmative  right  to  governmental  aid,  even
where  such  aid  may  be  necessary  to  secure  life.").
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critique  embodies  some  limited  and  partial  (and  important)
truths, but that it does  not by any  means  support a general  chal-
lenge  to  rights. 45  The  critics  of rights  have,  in  short, misconceived
their target.
A.  Definitional Issues
Begin with  a definition  of rights. This is a regrettably  complex
issue,  and  I will  have  to  deal  with  it  briefly and  tentatively  here."
Sometimes  the  term  "rights"  is  intended  to  refer  to  important
human interests,  or  (what is  not the same  thing) to those interests
that operate  as  "trumps" in  the sense  that they cannot  be compro-
mised  by  reference  to  collective  policies  or  goals.  If we  identify
rights with  important  human  interests,  the  critique  of rights  loses
its  force.  Who  could  object  to  social  protection  of important  hu-
man interests?
The  conception  of rights  as  interests that  operate  as  "trumps"
against  the  collectivity  raises  more  difficulty,  largely  because  it  is
not clear  that  this  conception  is  really  helpful.  The  first  problem
is  that almost  every  right  is  defeasible  at some  point, and defeasi-
ble just because  the  collective  interest  is very  strong. In American
law,  no  right  is  absolute.  If, for  example,  the  rest  of  the  human
race  will  be  eliminated  because  of  the  protection  of  a  right,  the
right will  certainly  be redefined  or legitimately  infringed,  probably
under  some  version  of  the  "compelling  interest"  test.  The  real
question  then  becomes  when  rights  are  defeasible  because  of col-
lective justifications-under  what conditions  and for what  reasons.
The  formula of "trumps" is misleading for this reason. We  need to
know  what  sorts  of  reasons  are  admissible  and  how  weighty  they
must be;  these  are  the  key questions  in the exploration  of rights.
Rights  characteristically  limit  the kinds  of arguments  that  can
be  used  by  way of justification,  and  they  characteristically  require
justifications  of  special  weight.47  Above  all,  rights  exclude  certain
45  For  similar  assessments,  see  McClain,  supra note  1, at  990-94.
46  For  an  especially  instructive  discussion  of  the  definition  of  rights,  see  RAZ,  supra
note  13,  at  165-92.
47  See  Richard  H.  Pildes,  Avoiding Reasons: Exclusionary Reasons  in  Constitutional Law,
45  HASrINGS  LJ. 711  (1994);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Incommensurability and Valuation in  Law, 92
MICH.  L.  REV.  779  (1994).  Note  that  it is  important  to  inquire  into  two  different  dimen-
sions-legitimacy  and  weight. Some  grounds  for  infringing  on rights  are inadmissible  even
if they are  weighty.  Thus,  racial  prejudice  is  not a  legitimate  reason  for racial  discrimina-
tion,  and  offense  at the  content  of ideas  is  not a  legitimate  reason  for  infringing on  free
speech.
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otherwise  admissible  reasons  for  action. 8  But  ideas  of  this  kind
do  not support  the  "trumps" metaphor  and indeed  lead  in quite
different directions.
The  second  problem  is  that. many  conceptual  puzzles  are
raised  by  the  understanding  of  rights  as  interests  operating
"against"  the  collectivity.  Often  rights  are  something  that  the
collectivity  recognizes  and protects in  order to protect its interests.
If this  is  so,  there  is  no  easy  opposition  between  rights  and  the
collectivity.  In fact  many  rights  are  best understood  as  a  solution
to a collective  action problem  and especially  to a prisoner's  dilem-
ma  faced  by  people  lacking  legal  entitlements;  property  rights
themselves  have  this  character. 9  Rights  are  collectively  conferred
and  designed  to  promote  collective  interests.  They  are  protected
by social institutions  for social  reasons. In such cases,  rights may in
a  sense  operate  against  the  collectivity  once  they  are  conferred;
government  may not take  property just because  it wants  to do so.
But even  in  such  cases,  rights  are  guaranteed  in the  first  instance
both  by and  for the  collectivity  (which of course  has  no existence
apart from the  individuals who  compose  it).
In any  case,  many  people  who  are  insistent  on  rights  do not
see  rights  as  opposing  the  collectivity,  at least  not  in  any  simple
sense.  Rights  often  have  the purpose  of creating a certain  kind  of
society.  Consider here Joseph  Raz's  suggestion:
If  I  were  to  choose  between  living  in  a  society  which  enjoys
freedom  of  expression,  but  not  having  the  right  myself,  or
enjoying  the right in  a society which  does  not  have it, I  would
have no  hesitation  in judging  that  my own  personal  interest is
better  served  by the first option."
The  point  suggests  that  many  rights  deserve  to  exist  because  of
their collective  consequences.
This  idea  can  be  embraced  by  people  from  diverse  perspec-
tives;  I  offer  some  truncated  remarks.  Utilitarians  would  be  likely
to  make  a large  space for rights,  because  the  protection  of identi-
fied  interests  as  rights  can  promote  utility.  There  is  no  tension
between utilitarianism  and rights,  though the  utilitarian account  of
rights  is  distinctive  and  controversial.5  Economic  analysts  of  law
48  See  the  discussion  of exclusionary  reasons  in JOSEPH  RAz,  PRACTICAL  REASON  AND
NORMS  35-48  (2d  ed.  1992).
49  See  COLEMAN,  supra note  14,  at 3.
50  JOSEPH  RAZ,  Rights  and Individual Well-Being,  in  ETHICS  IN THE  PUBLIC  DOMAIN:
ESSAYS  IN  THE  MORALrIY  OF  LAW  AND  POLITICS  29,  39  (1994).
51  SeeJONATHAN  RILEY,  LIBERAL  UTILITARIANISM  150-80  (1988);  see also RAZ,  supra note
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are hardly critical  of rights. On the contrary, they take  rights  to  be
crucial  instruments  for  promoting  economic  goals. 2  Those  who
emphasize  the  need  to  base  social  and  legal  practices  on  a  con-
ception  of  the  human  good,  or  of  human  flourishing,  will  also
make room for rights insofar  as rights  can  be shown to  be a meth-
od  of promoting human  flourishing.  Under  this  view,  a  concep-
tion  of the  good  is  prior  to a  conception  of the  right;  but rights
are  a  crucial  part  of the  good,  or  a  crucial  way  of achieving  the
good, for purposes  of both theory and  practice.
Some  people  associate  rights  with  "nature." 54  The  natural
rights  tradition  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  complex  one,  and  I  cannot
sort  out  its various  claims  here.  But  some  of those  who  point  to
"nature"  should  probably  be  understood  to  say  that  certain  dis-
tinctly  human  characteristics  and  capacities  call  for  or  fit  with  a
certain  category  of  rights.  If  social  and  legal  practices  must  be
based  on  the natural  capacities  of human  beings,  we might be  led
to  embrace  a  set  of  rights  that  promote  those  capacities.5  Per-
haps  people who  espouse  this view will  see natural  rights as worthy
of  respect  whatever  the  particular  community  may  think.  That
claim  may be  correct, but it does  not oppose  rights  in any  simple
sense  to  the  collectivity.  Many  of the rights  sought  by  the  natural
law  tradition  have  everything  to do  with sociality  and  its precondi-
tions.- 5
Of course  deontological  writers  offer  a very  different  concep-
tion  of  rights,  seeing  them  not  as  instruments  for  maximizing
utility  or wealth,  or as  a way  of promoting the  best conception  of
the  human  good,  but  as  reflecting  respect  for  individuals  as  per-
sons.57  Here  we  may  indeed  have  an  opposition  between  the  in-
dividual  and  the  community.  Under  this  conception  of rights,  it
remains  necessary  to justify  any particular  understanding  of rights,
and  thus  to  offer  reasons  for  their  existence.  But  perhaps  those
50,  at  32  (criticizing  the  utilitarian  account  of rights);  Amartya  Sen,  Rights and Agency,  11
PHIL.  &  PUB.  A.  3  (1982).
52  See,  e.g.,  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAw  1-15  (4th  ed.  1992).
53  See,  e.g.,  AMARiYA  SEN,  INEQUALITY  REEXAMINED  44-58  (1992);  Martha  Nussbaum,
Aristotelian Social Democracy,  in LIBERALISM  AND  THE  GOOD  228-240  (R.  Bruce  Douglass  et
al.  eds.,  1984).
54  See,  e.g.,  JOHN  FINNIS,  NATURAL  LAW  AND  NATURAL  RIGHTS  (1988).
55  This  conception  of rights  emerges  from  id.
56  See  id.
57  See,  e.g.,  DWORKIN,  supra  note  20,  at  212.  An  important  claim  for  duties  rather
than  rights  emerges  from  ONORA  O'NEILL,  CONSTRUCTIONS  OF  REASON:  EXPLORATIONS  OF
KANT'S  PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY  (1989).
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reasons  need  not  refer  to  collective  goals.  On  the  other  hand,
some  (broadly  speaking)  deontological  writers  do  insist  on  the
collective  goals  that  underlie  rights,  suggesting  that  rights  have
their origin  in such  goals." 8
Let us put these  conceptual  difficulties  to  one side and define
rights  in  a way  that should  be  congenial  to  both  supporters  and
critics  of rights:  Rights  are  legally enforceable  instruments  for  the
protection  of their  claimants.  Rights  are  thus practical  instruments
that  can  be  invoked  in  courts  of  law  by  individuals  or  groups
against both private  parties and the state.  (To  say that rights oper-
ate  against society  is not to say that their justification  is  not social.
Rights  operating, against  society  may have  social justification;  con-
sider  the  right  to  free  speech  or  the  right  to  private  property.)
This  is  a  highly  pragmatic  conception  of rights,  one  that  tries  to
put  philosophical  issues  to  one  side  and  to  identify  instead  the
actual  functions  of rights  in  the  world.  I  think  that it is  this  un-
derstanding  of rights, and not the contested theoretical  issues, that
underlies  the  critique  of rights.
B.  Republicanism, Liberalism, and Rights
Now shift to the place of rights  in American  constitutionalism.
A good  deal  of work  in  constitutional  law  has  dealt with  the  role
of "republican" thought  in  the  American  tradition."  The  republi-
can  ideal  prizes  a  deliberative  conception  of democracy-one  in
which  popular  sovereignty  entails  not  simple  majoritarianism,  but
an  effort to  ensure  a form of reason-giving  in the  public  sphiere. °
Efforts  to  revive  the  republican  tradition  have  been  designed  in
part  to oppose  the  view  that  the  protection  of antecedently  given
"rights"  is  the  sole  purpose  of the  American  constitutional  tradi-
tion.  On  the  contrary,  the  notion  that  rights  are  antecedently
given  leads  to  real  confusion.  Many  rights  are  protected  as  such
because  they  are  a  precondition  for  democratic  deliberation,"
58  For  a  particularly  illuminating  discussion,  see  RAZ,  supra note  13,  at  165-80.
59  See,  e.g.,  Frank  I.  Michelman,  The  Supreme  Court,  1985  Term-Foreword:  Traces  of
Self-Government,  100  HARV.  L.  REV.  4  (1986);  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Interest Groups in American
Public Law,  38  STAN.  L.  REV.  29  (1985);  Symposium,  The  Republican  Civic  Tradition, 97
YALE  L.J.  1493  (1988).
60  See  CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  THE  PARTIAL  CONSTITUTroN  17-21  (1993).
61  Many  but  not  all  rights  are  necessary  for  democratic  deliberation.  See James  E.
Fleming,  Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72  TEX.  L.  REV.  211  (1993).
1995]NOTRE  DAME LAW REVIEW
and in  any  case  the  American  constitutional  order seeks  delibera-
tion  about ordinary issues  not implicating  rights  at all.
Some  people  think  that  liberalism  and  republicanism  are  at
odds'  and  that rights  have  a  natural  place  in  liberalism  but  an
awkward  one  in  republican  thought.  But  there  is  no  opposition
between  the  liberal  tradition and the  republican  tradition  as  these
have  operated  in  the  United  States;  and  republicanism  is  hardly
hostile  to  rights.  To  be  sure,  we  could  generate  conceptions  of
republicanism  that  are  opposed  to  liberalism,  and  vice  versa.  A
conception of republicanism  that distrusts rights altogether,  or that
sees  duty to  the  community  as  an  overriding obligation  of all  citi-
zens,63  or  that  seeks  to  impose  a  unitary  conception  of the  good,
would  indeed  be  antiliberal.  Moreover,  a  conception  of liberalism
that  sees  politics  as  an  effort  to  aggregate  private  preferences
would  indeed  be  antirepublican,  since  it would  place  no  premium
on  deliberation  or  civic  virtue.  But  the  aspiration  to  deliberative
democracy  can  certainly  be  understood  in  such  a  way  as  to  be
both  liberal  and  republican.  The  liberal  tradition  is  committed  to
the  justification  of  government  outcomes  by  reference  to  rea-
sons64  and  also  to  a form of government  by  discussion.'
Some  critics  of the  "republican  revival"  think that republican-
ism  and  rights  are  at odds.  On  this  view,  republicanism  is  "omi-
nous" insofar  as  it  prizes democratic  deliberation  and downgrades
private  rights.'  But  this  is  a  misreading  of  the  republican  tradi-
tion.  The  Framers  of the  Constitution  were  certainly  republicans,
and  they  certainly believed  in  rights.  Modern  forms  of republican-
ism  are  enthusiastic  about  rights.  If deliberation  and  citizenship
are  desirable,  rights  of free  speech,  for  example,  seem  indispens-
able,  and  we  may  be  led  to  guarantee  rights  of religious  liberty,67
rights  of  private  property,  and  rights  in  the  criminal  justice  sys-
62  See,  e.g.,  Morton J.  Horwitz,  Republicanism and Liberalism in American  Constitutional
Thought, 29  WM.  &  MARY  L.  REV.  57  (1987).
63  See  Sunstein,  supra note  59,  at  40  n.51  (discussing  Benjamin  Rush's  proposal  for
teaching  each  citizen  "that  he  does  not  belong  to  himself,  but  that  he  is  public
property").
64  See  the  discussion  of public  reason  in  JOHN  RAWLS,  POLrIcAL  LIBERALISM  216-20
(1993).
65  See  SAMUEL  H.  BEER,  To  MAKE  A  NATION:  THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  AMERICAN  FEDER-
AuSM  (1993).
66  See  Martin  H.  Redish  &  Gary  Lippman,  Freedom of Expression and the  Civic Republi-
can Revival  in  Constitutional Theory:  The Ominous Implications, 79  CAL.  L.  REV.  267  (1991).
67  See  Stephen  Holmes,  Precommitment  and  the  Paradox  of  Democracy,  in
CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND  DEMOCRACY  195  (Jon  Elster  & Rune  Slagstad  eds.,  1988).
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tem-and  also  to  protect  the  rule  of law,  a constraint  on govern-
ment power that seems a precondition  for citizenship.s
Of course  a commitment  to republicanism-a  vagu6  and gen-
eral creed  capable  of many  diverse specifications-does  not lead to
any particular  constellation  of rights. But republicans  are  likely to
make much use  of rights  to promote  their own  deepest  ideals.
C.  Truths and Partial  Truths
From  the  previous  discussion  we  can  see  a  wide  range  of
strands in  the challenge  to rights.  The challenge  is  highly eclectic.
Moreover,  there  are  some  truths  in  many  of these  points, and  it
will  be useful  to explore  those  truths.
Of course  rights  do  depend  for  their  existence  on  collective
institutions.  As  we  know  them,  rights  require  public  protection
and  support.69  Protection  of  the  individual-of  property  or  per-
son-cannot  easily  occur  without  collective  help."  But  this  de-
scriptive  point  is  hardly  an  argument  against  rights.  Many  good
things  depend  for  their  existence  on  collective  institutions,  and
this  is  not an argument  that those  things  are bad. Economic  pros-
perity, a pluralistic  culture,  sufficient quantities  of nutrition,  hous-
ing  for  all  or  most,  freedom  from  violence,  racial  equality,  low
rates  of unemployment-all  these  are,  under  imaginable  condi-
tions,  secured  best  or only  with  collective  help.  They  are  no  less
desirable  for that."
68  I  discuss  some  of  these  issues  in  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  On  Property  and
Constitutionalism, 14  CARDOZO  L.  REv.  907  (1993).
69  An  important  qualification  comes  from  ROBERT  ELuICKSON,  ORDER  WITHOUT  LAW
(1991)  (showing  that social  norms,  with  law-like  functions,  can  emerge  spontaneously).
70  Self-help  remedies  are  of course  imaginable,  but  they would  likely  lead  to  much
more  fragile  protection  of property  and  person  than modem  polities  seek.
71  The  general  point  is  made  by  the  greatest  critic  of socialism  in  the  twentieth
century, Friedrich  Hayek:
It  is  regrettable,  though  rot  difficult  to  explain,  that  in  the  past  much  less  at-
tention  has  been  given  to  the  positive  requirements  of  a  successful  working  of
the  competitive  system  than  to  these  [previously  discussed]  negative  points. The
functioning  of  a  competition  not  only  requires  adequate  organisation  [sic]  of
certain  institutions  like  money,  markets,  and  channels  of  information-some  of
which  can  never  be  adequately  provided  by  private  enterprise-but  it depends
above  all  on  the  existence  of  an  appropriate  legal  system,  a  legal  system  de-
signed  both  to  preserve  competition  and  to  make  it  operate  as  beneficially  as
possible  ... . In  no  system  that  could  be  rationally  defended  would  the  state
just do  nothing.  An  effective  competitive  system  needs  an  intelligently  designed
and  continuously  adjusted  legal  framework  as  much  as  any  other.
FRIEDRIGH  HAYEK,  THE  ROAD  TO  SERFDOM  28-29  (1946).
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It is  also  important  to  point out  that references  to rights  can
make  for  unduly  rigid  understandings  of complex  problems  and
can sometimes  stop discussion  in its tracks  before analysis has  even
started.  Claims  of right often  have  the  vices  of rules.  Even  worse,
rights  can  be  conclusions  masquerading  as  reasons.  In  thinking
about claims  of right, it is  often  necessary  to  be  detailed and con-
crete  about  the  social  consequences  of competing  courses  of ac-
tion.  The  invocation  of  "rights"  can  be  a  serious  obstacle  to  this
process.  Consider,  for  example,  the  current  debates  over  regula-
tion of the  electronic  media, violent  pornography,  hate  speech  at
universities,  or advertising  for cigarettes.  To say that any restriction
on  these  forms  of expression  violates  the  "right  to  free  speech"
may in  the  end be  correct;  but this  requires  a  long and  complex
argument,  not  a  shorthand  phrase.  The  claim  of a  "right to  free
speech"  is  far  too  general  and  abstract  to  support the  argument.
Here  it  does  seem  important  and  true  to  say  that  rights,  stated
abstractly,  do  not  solve  concrete  cases.  They  are  indeterminate
until  they are specified.
As  they  operate  in  law,  rights  generally  are  specified.  Hence
the  rights protected  by  the  Constitution  and  the  common  law  are
far from  indeterminate,  however  hard it is  to  know what  they are
when  stated  abstractly.  The  claim  of indeterminacy  is  for this  rea-
son far too broad. The  problem, to which  the  critics have  correct-
ly  drawn  attention,  lies  in  the  use  of general  claims  of  right  to
resolve  cases in which  the  specification  has  not yet occurred.
It  is  also  true  that  efforts  to  think  about  many  social  and
economic problems  in terms of rights can obscure  those  problems.
A  claimed  right  to  clean  air  and  water  or  to  safe  products  and
workplaces  makes  little  sense  in  light of the  need for close  assess-
ment, in particular  cases,  of the  advantages  of greater environmen-
tal  protection  or  more  safety,  as  compared  with  the  possible  ac-
companying  disadvantages-higher  prices,  lower  wages,  less  em-
ployment,  and  more  poverty.  Perhaps  the  legal  system  will  create
rights of a kind after it has undertaken  this assessment.  But  to the
extent  that  the  regulatory  programs  of the  1970s  were  billed  as
simple  vindications  of  "rights,"  they  severely  impaired  political
deliberation  about  their content and about the necessity for trade-
offs.72
It  seems  correct  too  to  say  that  civic  virtue-responsibility  to
one's  neighbors  and  to  one's  nation-is  an  important  part  of
72  I  attempt  to  defend  this  claim  in  SUNSTEIN,  supra note  10,  at 74-110.
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citizenship.  This  is  an  aspect  of citizenship  that  is  notoriously  ne-
glected in public  discussion and social practice. Whether  rights are
the  culprit here  may  be  questioned.  But insofar  as  rights  are  un-
derstood  in  purely self-iAterested  terms,  it  is  certainly  conceivable
that they can  crowd out issues  of responsibility.
Nor should  it be denied  that rights, can protect existing  distri-
butions  and  practices.  Many  rights,  particularly  those  associated
with  the  Takings  Clause  of  the  Fifth  Amendment  and  the  Due
Process  Clauses  of  the  Fifth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments,  have
been  so  understood  for  many  years.7'  But  this  is  hardly  a  chal-
lenge  to  rights. Whether  rights  do have  this  function  depends  not
on  their  status  as  rights  but on  what, particularly,  rights  are.  And
whether  rights  should protect  existing  distributions  'and  practices
cannot be  decided  in  the abstract. Such  protection is  not always  a
bad  idea.  Whether  it  is  justified  depends  on  the  appropriate
weight  to  be  given  to  the  interests  in  stability  and  expectations,
and  on  the  merits  of  those  distributions  and  practices.  This  is  a
complex  matter that cannot  be resolved  a priori.
D.  Confusions and Misconceptions
Despite  the various  partial  truths in the  attack  on rights,  there
is  a  pervasive  problem  in  that  attack:  Rights  need  not  have  the
functions  or consequences  that they are alleged  to have.  The  chal-
lenge  to rights  is  properly  directed  against certain  kinds  of rights,
not  against  rights  in  general.  At  most,  the  challenge  to  rights
creates  a  contingent,  partial  warning  about  the  appropriate  con-
tent of rights  and about the  possibly harmful  role  of certain social
institutions  safeguarding  rights.  It  is  not what  it purports  to  be,
that  is,  a  general  claim  about  rights  as  a  social  institution.  More
specifically,  the  current  devaluation  of  rights  suffers  from  two
serious  problems.  Both  of  these  problems  are  products  of  some
pervasive  confusions.
Many  critics  of rights  complain  about what  they  see  as  a  cul-
tural  shift  from  the  1960s,  in  which  rights  have  crowded  out  re-
sponsibilities.74  Simply  as  a  matter  of  cultural  description,  the
claim  is far  too crude.  In some  areas,  including for example  sexu-
ality,  it  is  plausible  to  say  that  a  belief in  private  autonomy  has
73  See,  e.g.,  RIcHARD  A.  EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS  (1985);  Cass  R- Sunstein,  Sexual  Orientation
and the  Constitution: A  Note  on  the Relationship Between Due  Process and Equal Protection, 55
U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  1161  (1988).
74  See,  e.g.,  GLENDON,  supra note  1, at  1-17.
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prevailed at the expense  of a commitment  to  responsible  behavior.
But in other areas, the  last few decades  have witnessed  an increase
in social and legal  responsibilities  and  a decreased  commitment  to
rights. Consider, for example, cigarette  smoking;  corporate  miscon-
duct;  air  and  water  pollution;  sexual  harassment;  and  racist  and
sexist  speech.  In  all  of  these  areas,  people  who  were  formerly
autonomous,  and free  to  act in accordance  with their  own  claims
of  right,  are  now  subject  to  socially  and  sometimes  legally  en-
forced  responsibilities.  We  have  seen,  in  the  last  few  decades,  a
redefinition  of areas  of right and  a redefinition  of areas  of respon-
sibility.  I  do not  intend  to  celebrate  these  redefinitions,  but only
to suggest  that  purely  as  a  matter  of description,  there  has  been
no  general  shift from  responsibility  to  rights.
Now  turn from description  to  evaluation.  The first problem  is
that whether rights are associated  with  excessive  individualism, with
excessive  self-interest,  or  with  anything  else  that  is  excessive  de-
pends  on  what  rights  specifically  are.  It  should  go without  saying
that  rights  are  designed  to  protect  human  beings,75  each  of
whom  is  an  individual;  but  this  cannot  be  a  complaint  of  the
critics  of  rights.  Instead,  many  such  critics  seem  to  object  that
rights  are  associated  with  pernicious  forms  of  individualism  and
self-interestedness.  But  this  is  not the  case.  To  take  two  examples,
the  right  to  subsistence  and  the  right  to  environmental  quali-
ty-whether  or  not these  should be  codified  in law-do  not seem
to  promote  selfishness.  Both  rights  might be products  of altruism,
and  may  promote  altruism  and  even  feelings  of responsibility.  In
fact many  rights  are  designed  to encourage  precisely  the  forms  of
deliberation  and  communal  interaction  that  critics  favor.  A  wide
range  of protected  interests  count  as  "rights,"  and  the  critics  fail
to  make  some  important  distinctions  among  diverse  legal  instru-
ments.
The  second  problem  is  that the  critics seem  to think that  the
explosion  of  "rights  talk"  accounts  for  certain  social  failures,  in-
cluding  failures  of  social  responsibility.  This  is  far  too  simple  a
claim.  In  fact, the  opposite  is  as  likely  true-failures  of social  re-
sponsibility  give  rise  to  assertions  of  rights.  In  any  case,  the
claimed  association  depends  on  empirical  claims  that  are  highly
speculative  and  that lack  clear support.
75  I  mean  to  put  to  one  side  and  not  to  assess  the  question  whether  nonhuman
creatures  or  objects  should  have  rights,  for  the  ultimate  protection  of  human  beings  or
for  other  reasons.
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1.  Diverse  Rights
The  two  problems  can  be  brought  together if we  attend  to a
familiar  conceptual  confusion. 6  Often  critics  write  as  if rights  and
responsibilities  are  opposed,  or  as  if  those  who  favor  the  former
are  completely  different  from  those  who  favor  the  latter.  As  they
see  it,  rights  are  individual,  atomistic,  selfish,  crude,  licentious,
antisocial,  and  associated  with  the  Warren  Court.  Responsibilities,
on  the  other  hand,  are  seen  as  collective,  social,  altruistic,  nu-
anced,  and  associated  with  appropriate  or  traditional  values.  But
this  understanding  is  quite  inadequate,  for  some  rights  lack  the
characteristics  claimed  for  them,  and  other  rights  have  the  fea-
tures  associated  with  responsibilities."'
For example,  the  right  to  freedom  of speech  may be  owned
by  individuals,  but it  is  a precondition  for a highly  social  process,
that of democratic  deliberation.  That right  keeps  open  the  chan-
nels  of communication;  it  is  emphatically  communal  in character.
It ensures  a  sine  quo  non  of sociality,  an  opportunity  for people
to  speak  with  one  other.  Indeed,  everyone  who  owns  a  speech
right does  so  partly  so as  to  contribute  to the  collectivity;  it is  this
fact  that explains  the government's  inability to "buy" speech  rights
even  when  a  speaker  would  like  to  sell.7'  So  too,  the  right  to
associational  freedom  is  hardly individualistic.  It is meant precisely
to protect  collective' action  and sociality.
Consider  another  time-honored  liberal  right,  the  right  to  a
jury  trial.  This  right  is  far  from  atomistic.  Quite  the  contrary,  it
ensures  a  role  for  the  community  in  adjudicative  proceedings.79
The  right to  religious  liberty  protects  individuals  (surely  this does
not count  against the  right),  but it is  also  designed  to  protect  the
collectivity  by ensuring social peace  and thus by making democracy
possible." 0  The  right  to  vote,  also  owned  by  individuals,  protects
76  A  related  confusion  is  embodied  in  the  notion  that  rights  posit a  wholly  autono-
mous,  asocial  "subject."  Rights  do  no  such  thing.  They  are  political  instruments  with  no
necessary  metaphysical  foundation.
77  See,  e.g.,  Akhil  R.  Amar,  The Bill  of Rights As A  Constitution, 100  YALE  LJ.  1131,
1201-10  (1991)  (discussing  the  nonatomistic  character  of  most  rights  at  the  founding
period).
78  See,  e.g.,  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Government  Control of Information,  79  CAL.  L.  REV.  889,
914-16  (1986).
79  See Amar,  supra note  77,  at  1182-99.
80  See  Stephen  Holmes,  Gag Rules  or the Politics of  Omission, in  CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND  DEMOCRACY  19  (ion Elster  &  Rune  Slagstad  eds.,  1988).
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collective  processes  of governance.  The  right to be free from  racial
discrimination,  protected  against  the  states  by  the  Fourteenth
Amendment,  is  not  antisocial.  It  ensures  communal  decency  by
protecting against the  exclusion  of subordinated  groups. The right
to  be  free  from  racial  discrimination  also  guarantees  a  form  of
sociality.
Even  the  right to  property  can  be  understood  not as  a  meth-
od  for  protecting  self-interested  acquisition  (though  it does  have
this  function),  but  instead  as  an  indispensable  condition  for  citi-
zenship,  a  collective  goal  and  a  collective  good. 81  If property  can
be  taken  at the  government's  whim,  people  are  not likely to have
the  independence  and  the  security  that  will  permit them  to  criti-
cize  the  government  openly.  More  generally,  we  have  seen  that
the  right  to  private  property  solves  a  collective  action  problem
faced  by  everyone  in  the  state  of nature,  and  in  that  sense,  sup-
plies  what  is  both  technically  and  nontechnically  described  as  a
collective  good.
At  this  stage  we  can  make  the  Hohfeldian" 2  point  too  often
neglected  by  many  critics  of rights:  In  an  important  sense,  rights
and  duties  imply  each  other."  They  are  correlative.  To  say  that
someone  has a right is usually  to say  that someone  else has a duty.
If Jones  has  a  right to property,  other  people  have  a  duty  not to
trespass  on what Jones  owns.  If Smith  has  a right to  be free  from
racial  discrimination  in  employment,  employers  have  a  duty  to
ignore  the  color  of  Smith's  skin.  The  right  not  to  be  murdered
imposes  a  duty  on  people  not  to  take  the  lives  of others.  Rights
are  not  opposed  to  responsibilities.  On  the  contrary,  rights  are
responsibilities.
Not only  do rights  create  duties, but the imposition  of a duty
also  serves  to  create  a  right. If X  is  under a  duty not  to  discrimi-
nate  or  not  to  trespass,  people  dealing  with  X  possess  certain
rights.  Most  duties  create  a  correlative  right. Return,  in  this  con-
nection,  to one of Professor Glendon's  special  concerns-the  ques-
tion  whether  we  should  create  a  duty  to  help  others.  That  duty
seems  to  be  a  classic  communal  responsibility,  far  removed  from
the  legalistic  world  of  rights.  But  appearances  are  misleading.
81  See JEREMY  WALDRON,  THE  RIGHT  TO  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  1-30  (1988)  (discussing  the
diverse  functions  of  the  right  to property).
82  See  Wesley  N.  Hohfeld,  Some  Fundamental Legal  Conceptions  As  Applied  in  Judicial
Reasoning, 23  YALE  LJ.  16  (1913).
83  A  qualification  emerges  from  RAZ,  supra note  13,  at  170-71,  but  the  qualification
does  not  seem  important  to  my  purposes  here.
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Indeed, Glendon's  discussion  comes close  to an argument  not only
for  a new  duty, but also  for a  new right:  a right  to  assistance,  to
be  granted  to  vulnerable  people  and  held  by  them  against  both
other  people  and  the  government.  Glendon  herself  refers  to
Franklin  Roosevelt's  proposed  "second  bill  of  rights,"  which  in-
cluded  the  right  to  adequate  food  and  clothing,  to  a  decent
home,  to  adequate  medical  care,  to  good  education,  and  to  a
useful  and  remunerative  job. 4  Of  course  these  are  rights  and
their  invocation  represents  a form  of "rights  talk,"  but  they  cer-
tainly  and  emphatically  reflect  a  sense  of  collective  responsibili-
ty.'  They  are  not  associated  with  self-interest,  or  at least  not  (in
any  simple sense)  with  the self-interest  of those  who  must respect
them.
It  is  perfectly  possible  that  any  such  second  bill  of  rights
would  be  a  bad  idea. That  is  not my point.  No  one  should  deny
that  the  proliferation  of rights  may  be  unfortunate  or  worse;  too
many  rights  may  even  contradict  one  another.  The  new  Eastern
European  Constitutions  are an  unfortunate  illustration."  I  am  not
attempting  to defend  any particular system  or set of rights, but in-
stead suggesting  something  far simpler:  Since  rights tend  to imply
responsibilities  simply as  a matter  of logic, and  vice versa,  it is  not
easy  to understand the claim  that American  law needs responsibili-
ties rather than  or in addition  to rights.
The  claimed  opposition  between  rights  and  responsibilities
faces  some additional  difficulties  as  well.  Rights  of the  most tradi-
tional sort, including property, may be the necessary  condition  for
enabling  a  sense  of  collective  responsibility  to  flourish.  People
without  rights  to  their property  may  be  so  dependent  on  official
will  that  they  cannot  exercise  their  responsibilities  as  citizens.
Moreover,  a  principal  characteristic  of  totalitarian  states  is  the
endless cataloguing  of responsibilities  owed  by citizens  to the state.
The  Soviet  Constitution  was  an  ignoble  example.  For  example,
that  Constitution  created  a  duty  "to  make  thrifty  use  of  the
84  President  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  Message  to  Congress  on  the  State  of the  Union
(Jan.  11,  1944),  in  13  THE  PUBLIC  PAPERS  AND  ADDRESSES  OF  FRANKLIN  D.  ROOSEVELT  32,
41  (Samuel  I.  Rosenman  ed.,  1969);  see also GLENDON,  supra note  1, at  104.
85  The  suggestion  that  responsibility  should be  exercised  instead  of legal  compulsion
is  taken  up  in  Part III  infra.
86  See  Cass  R.  Sunstein,  Something 014  Something New,  E.  EuR.  CONST.  REv.,  Spring
1992,  at  18.
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people's  wealth,"" 7  "to  preserve  and  protect  socialist  property,"'
to  "work  conscientiously,"9  and  "to  concern  themselves  with  the
upbringing  of  children." 9  The  Soviet  Constitution  offers  a  cau-
tionary  note  against enthusiasm  for responsibilities,  at least if these
are  to  be  treated  as  an  explicit,  legally  codified  concern  of  the
state  (putting the Hohfeldian  point to  one  side)."
These  points  suggest  a  broad  conclusion  about  the  recent
criticism  of rights.  Those  who  believe  in  more  reflective  public
deliberation  are  making  an  important  point; we  have  far too little
such deliberation,  and part of the problem  involves  unduly simple
arguments  based  on  alleged  rights.  But  the  critics  should  not
claim  to  be  making  so  general  a  criticism  of rights.  Instead,  they
should  offer  a  fine-grained  account  allowing  people  to  identify
both  the  sorts  of  interests  that  cannot  be  intruded  on  without
special justification  and the  sorts of institutions  that should protect
various  interests.  Surely such  an  inquiry  will justify  a  redescription
of certain interests  in terms that  have  nothing to do with rights  or
that  treats  rights  not  as  axiomatic  but as  the  outcomes  of a  com-
plex  set  of judgments.  For  example,  consider  the  problems  of
environmental  protection  and  plant  closings. 2  But  it  is  equally
certain  that many  "rights" will  survive  in their  current state.
2.  Constitutional  Rights and Judicial  Review
It  is  important  to  insist  that such  an  inquiry will  suggest  that
the  category  of human  rights  is  not coextensive  with  the  category
of  constitutional  rights  or  the  category  of judicially  enforceable
rights.  Constitutional  rights  qualify  as  such  for  special  and  partly
contingent  reasons,  having  to do with institutional  issues  and with
the  reasons  for  distrust  of  ordinary  politics  in  the  particular  na-
tion. 9"  Constitutional  rights  are  usually  and  rightly  thought  to
have  a  "vertical" dimension,  allocating  power  between  the  govern-
ment  and  the  individual.  But  they  also  have  an  important  "hori-
zontal"  dimension,  allocating  power  among  different  branches  of
government  by,  for  example,  granting  authority  to  the judiciary
87  Id.  (Article  61).
88  Id.
89  Id.  (Article  60).
90  Id.  (Article  65).
91  See id. at  18-19.
92  See  GLENDON,  supra note  1, at  29-30,  111-12.
93  See  Cass R.  Sunstein,  Liberal  Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72  TEx.  L.  REv.
305  (1993).
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that might  otherwise  be  exercised  by  the  legislature.  The horizon-
tal  allocation  requires  some justification  in  terms  of the  different
capacities  of different institutions.
Many  critics  are  speaking  to  the  issue  of institutional  charac-
ter, complaining  about  courts,  not about  rights.94  But there  is  of-
ten a solid justification for a constitutional and also judicial role in
the  protection  of rights.  Under  plausible  assumptions,  the  institu-
tion of constitutional  rights will  survive  as  an invaluable  one,  espe-
cially to the extent that such  rights can safeguard  interests that are
at excessive  risk in  ordinary politics. It is  also likely,  in many imag-
inable  situations,  that the  institution of judicial  review  will  survive
as  well.95  Many  prominent  critics  of judicial  review  are  making
conceivably  but  only  contingently  convincing  empirical  claims
about  the  likely  inclinations  and  character  of judges."  They  are
not doing what they purport to be  doing, that is,  showing a gener-
al incompatibility between judicially vindicated constitutional  rights
and  democracy.  Often  such  rights  promote  democracy,  and  are
not  antithetical  to  it. 97  The  'attack  on  an  excessive  judicial  role
should be  separated from  the  attack on rights  as  such.
3.  The Legal  System  and Its  Pathologies
Perhaps  these basic arguments  would  not entirely satisfy  many
critics  of rights.  Perhaps  they would want  to  characterize  the  prob-
lem  as  the  constant  resort  to  the  legal  system  as  a  remedy  for
social  ills,  rather than  the use  of public deliberative  processes  and,
best  of  all,  of self-help  and  nongovernmental  institutions.  In  the
last generation  we  have  seen quite  absurd  claims  of right in  cases
involving  the  law  of  tort  and  the  law  of  the  Constitution.  Is  it
unconstitutional-invasive  of  right-for  government  to  require
people  to  wear  helmets  when  they  ride  motorcycles?"  Many  peo-
ple  think  that  such  questions  are  rhetorical  and  that  such  cases
give  rights  a bad  name.
94  See,  e.g.,  WALDRON,  supra note 81.
95  There  is  of  course  a  difference  between  constitutional  rights  and  judicially  en-
forceable  constitutional  rights;  some  constitutional  rights  might  be  enforceable  only
through  politics.
96  See  WALDRON,  supra note 81.
97  The  classic  statement  is JOHN  HART  ELY,  DEMOCRAcY  AND  DISTRUST  (1980).
98  See,  e.g.,  Picou  v.  Gillum,  874  F.2d  1519  (11th  Cir.),  cert.  denied,  493  U.S.  920
(1989).
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It  may  therefore  be  the  peculiar  interaction  between  Ameri-
can  individualism,  American  law,  and  "rights  talk,"  rather  than
rights  themselves,  with  which  critics  are  most concerned.  On  this
view,  the  problem  is  not  so  much  rights  in  general,  but  rights
claims  that deny  obligations  to  others,  that  ignore  the  possibility
that  private  actors  can  and  should  take  care  of  themselves,  and
that  are  associated  with  immaturity,  personal  self-interest,  hedo-
nism,  and  the  short term.  To  the  extent  that  the  critics  seek  to
revive  a  richer and more  differentiated  kind  of public  debate  and
to  emphasize  the  need  for  greater  attention  to  the  possibilities
and  obligations  of private  organizations,  they are  entirely  persua-
sive.  The  mind-numbingly  familiar  oppositions  of matched  legalis-
tic  rights-pro-life  versus  pro-choice,  associational  freedom  versus
nondiscrimination,  business  autonomy  versus  employment
rights-are part of the  culture of the soundbite,  which  provides  no
help  to  those  seeking  to  think  through  or  to  assist  people  with
complex  realities.
But  it  is  important  to  sort  out  the  relationships  between
"rights  talk"  and  "the  impoverishment  of  political  discourse."'
Some  critics  suggest  that political  discourse  is  in  significant  part a
creature  of what  happens  with  courts  and  law."0  But  this  is  an
empirical  claim,  and it  may not be  true.  To be  sure,  political  dis-
course  is  often impoverished,  and  correctives  for the current situa-
tion should be  a  principal  concern  of current  reformers.  This  is  a
central  issue  for modern  democracies.  If one  looks  at the  promi-
nent  places  for  political  discussion-say,  the  television  and  most
popular  radio  stations-one  will  find  little  deliberation  and  little
serious  attention  to  public  issues,  and  such  attention  as  there  is
appears  sensationalistic,  prurient,  sentimental,  and  banal.'
Sometimes  the  banality consists  of reflexive  claims  about rights.
Important  questions,  however,  remain:  To  what  extent  can
this phenomenon  be attributed  to  "rights  talk" within the judiciary
and  the  legal  system?  By  what  mechanism  has  "rights  talk"  pro-
duced  problems  in  public  deliberation?  Can  an  association  be
shown?  Careful  work  has  shown  that  many  arguments  about  the
social  effects  of judicial  decisions  tend  to  be  overstated,  specula-
99  GLENDON,  supra note  1, at x.
100  See,  e.g.,  id. at  87,  105.
101  See,  e.g.,  GASS  R.  SUNSTEIN,  DEMOCRACY  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  FREE  SPEECH  (1993).
For  a  helpful  discussion  of American  traditions  in  this  respect,  see  JOSEPH  M.  BESSETrE,
THE  MILD  VOICE  OF  REASON  1-39  (1994).
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tive,  or  without  much  support.1
12 The  current  situation-of  inad-
equate  democratic  deliberation-is  not clearly  traceable  to judicial
protection  of  rights.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  far  more  plausibly  a
product  of  the  system  of  education  and  the  demands  of  the
broadcasting  market."°  If  the  critics'  concern  is  with  impover-
ished  political  discourse,  they  might  focus  on  the  incentives,
norms,  and  practices  of  those  who  impart  political  informa-
tion-on  their  responsibilities,  and  on  the  legal  framework,  or
rights, under which  they undertake  those  responsibilities.
There  is  enormous  room for reform  here,  drawing  on  experi-
ence  in other nations and involving changes  both  in private  sector
practices  and  in  the  regulatory  system  governing  the  media.",4
For example,  the  government might  offer  larger  subsidies  to  high
quality  broadcasting  or  encourage  more  attention  to  public  issues
through  licensing policies.  It might  offer guidelines  or recommen-
dations  designed  to  work  against  the  culture  of the  soundbite.  It
might  attempt  to encourage  opinion  polls  that  involve  public  de-
liberation  rather  than  quick  and  often  ill-considered  individual
reactions."5  All  this  seems  plausible.  What  I  am  questioning  is
the suggestion  that  "rights" are  a  major culprit  here. On  the  con-
trary, rights of some  sort are likely  to  be  an important part of any
effort to improve  public  deliberation.
III.  RIGHTS  AND  RESPONSIBILITIES  REVISITED
I  have suggested  that many  of the most enthusiastic  and  vivid
challenges  to  rights  are  based  on  the  idea that the  American  em-
phasis on rights,  and perhaps  especially on legal  rights, has caused
a  weakened  sense  of  social  responsibility.  The  Hohfeldian
point-that  rights  impose  responsibilities,  while  responsibilities
create rights-severely  complicates  this idea. But putting that point
to  one side, we  should  acknowledge  that an  insistence on people's
rights  ought  not  to  disparage  people's  responsibilities.  This  idea
could  perhaps  qualify  as  a  twenty-first-century  analogue  to  the
Ninth  Amendment.'  Certainly  we  should  keep  in  mind  the  im-
portant point  that people  may  have  a  right to  do  something  that
102  See generally GERALD  N.  ROSENBERG,  THE  HOLLOW  HOPE  (1990).
103  See C.  EDWIN  BAKER,  ADVERTISING  AND  A  DEMOCRATIC  PRESS  44-82  (1994).
104  See  id. at 80-82.
105  SeeJAMES  FISHKIN,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DELIBERATION  (1991).
106  "The enumeration  in  the  Constitution, of certain  rights, shall  not be construed  to
deny  or  disparage  others  retained  by  the  people."  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  IX.
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they  would  be  irresponsible  to  do. Or  to put  things  another way,
it may  be very wrong  to exercise  one's  rights.
Indeed, it is  unquestionably  objectionable  to  engage  in  much
conduct  that  one  has  a  right  to  do.  Some  platitudes  are  worth
repeating:  We  may  have  a right  to  say  offensive  things,  even  gro-
tesquely  offensive  things,  but most people  do  not and should  not
exercise  that  right  very  often.  People  may  have  a  right  to  treat
each  other  in  many  disrespectful  ways,  but disrespectful  treatment
is not for that reason acceptable.  An  extremely wealthy  person has
a right to keep  all  his money  (after taxes),  and  to  give none  of it
to  charity,  but selfishness  and  hoarding  are  not  to be  applauded.
A  lawyer  has  a  right  to  refuse  to  do  pro  bono  work,  but  lawyers
should  generally  do  pro bono work.
The  point  bears  particularly  on  the  controversial  issues  of
pregnancy  and  abortion.  Under  the  Constitution,  women  have  a
right to  have  abortions.  But  it is  important  to  insist that this  is  a
right  that ought  not  to be  exercised,  or  to  have  to  be  exercised,
very  often,  and  that  in  a  society  with  1.5  million  abortions  per
year,  something  is  extremely  wrong.  Even  people  who  favor  the
abortion  right  ought to  be clear  that  an abortion  is  a tragic  event
and  that  steps  should  be  taken  to  make  abortions  rare.  In  the
aftermath  of  the  Supreme  Court's  refusal  to  overrule  Roe  v.
Wade,"7  it  is  perfectly  appropriate  for  people  on  all  sides  of the
issue  to  shift public  debate  in  the  direction  of ways  to  minimize
the  incidence  of abortion.  Efforts  to  discourage  pregnancies  that
will  result  in  abortions,  and  even  to  discourage  abortion  itself
through  moral  suasion,  should  not, as  a  general  rule,  be  taken  as
unfortunate  interferences  with  a  "right,"  even  if some  such  efforts
might be rejected  as  punitive  or discriminatory.
However  we  may think about this  heated subject,  the  example
demonstrates  the  basic  point  that  a  nation  ought  not  to  say  that
because  people  have  a legal  right to  do something,  society  and its
various  components  have  no  business  complaining  about  people
who  exercise  that right, or  engaging  in moral  disapproval  of peo-
ple who  do what they  have  a right to  do.  On  the  contrary, a  large
part of moral  education  consists  of  the  inculcation  of norms  and
values  that discourage  harmful  or offensive  behavior  even  though
it is  not unlawful.  One  possible  pathology  of a culture  of rights  is
that people  will think that because  they  have  a right to  do  X,  they
cannot  be  criticized  or  blamed  for  doing  X.  This  conclusion  ap-
107  See Planned  Parenthood  v.  Casey,  112  S.  Ct.  2791  (1992).
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pears  to have  become common  with  respect  to free  speech, where
speakers  sometimes  complain  that it is  objectionable  even  to chal-
lenge  them  for  engaging  in  offensive  or  degrading  speech." 0 8  A
well-functioning'  culture  distinguishes  legal  censure  from  moral
censure.  It allows  people  the freedom  to do many  things that are
properly criticized  on moral  grounds.
The  point bears  on recent  claims  by Justice  Thomas and  oth-
er critics  of rights. Justice  Thomas  is  concerned  that an  emphasis
on what people  have a  right to  do has produced  a kind of moral
relativism  and  standardlessness  where  right-holders  insist  on  their
rights and  do not pause  to evaluate  whether  their conduct  is valu-
able  to  themselves  or  to  society.  Justice  Thomas  is  particularly
troubled  that  the grant  of rights  can  make  people,  and  especially
disadvantaged  people,  think of  themselves  as  victims,  whose  basic
goal  is  to assert  their  claims  and  to  seek  protection  from  govern-
ment. On  this  view,  the  recognition  of rights  can  generate  forms
of dependency,  self-pity,  and  lack  of  initiative  that are  extremely
damaging to  rights-holders  themselves.  Ideas  of this  sort have  also
played  a  role  in  recent  arguments,  sometimes  made  by
self-proclaimed  feminists  countering  certain  prominent  feminist
claims-with  the critics  urging that the  emphasis  on, for  example,
rights  against sexual harassment  and pornography  has encouraged
women  to  join  a  cult  of  victimhood,  in  which  equality  and
self-respect  become  all  the  more  difficult to obtain.109
The  fear  of an  association  between  the  recognition  of legal
rights and failures in responsibility  and self-help  seems plausible  in
many  settings.  People  who  lack  rights  to  desirable  goods
may-from  fear,  self-interest,  or  sheer  desperation-engage  in
socially productive  conduct.  (Of course  they may engage in  unpro-
ductive  and even  dangerous  conduct instead.)  For  example,  there
is  a  familiar  and  wholly  reasonable  fear  that  a  "right to  welfare"
could  discourage  productive  labor.  It  is  possible  too  that  people
who  think of themselves  as victims,  needing  and enforcing  rights,
will fail  to engage  in activity  that  is  ultimately  rewarding  to them-
selves  and  to society as  a whole.
108  For  example,  some people  have  claimed  "censorship"  in  response  to  Senator  Paul
Simon's  attempts  to  monitor  televised  violence.  See,  e.g.,  Raymond  L.  Fischer,  Is It  Possible
to  Regulate  Television  Violence?,  USA  TODAY, July,  1994  (Magazine),  at  72  (describing  the
ACLU's  position  that  "violent  speech  has  been  protected  by  the  First  Amendment  for
more  than  50  years"  and  media  organizations'  opposition  to  the  "momentum  building  in
Washington  for censorship  as a  solution  to  violence").
109  See  SOMMERS,  supra note  1;  STROSSEN,  supra note  24,  at  119-40,  179-215.
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These  claims  are,  however,  empirical  ones, and  they are  quite
speculative.  They  cannot  be credited  in the abstract. Whether  they
are  true,  and  in what  settings  they  are  true,  requires  much  more
work  than  has  been  supplied  thus  far.  Indeed,  the  converse  phe-
nomenon  may occur, with  recipients  of rights  conceiving  of them-
selves  as  anything  but victims  and  helpless.  Perhaps  people  who
are  given rights-to  own  property,  to  be  free from  segregation,  to
be free  from sexual harassment-will  be more likely  to  conceive  of
themselves  as  receiving  and  deserving  equal  respect.  It  is  surely
plausible  that the recognition  of rights  often converts  people  from
victims  into  citizens.  Certainly  a  major  point of rights guarantee  is
to  do precisely  this.
In  an  important  respect,  moreover,  the  critique  of rights  in
favor  of  responsibilities  seems  to  have  things  backward.  Rights
claims  are  often  a  response  to  a  failure  of  social  responsibility
rather  than  a  cause  of individual  irresponsibility.  We  might  look
again  at  the  abortion  problem,  which,  for  many,  exemplifies  the
hazards  of  rights-based  approaches." °  To  be  sure,  it  does  seem
inadequate  to  think of abortion  in  terms of a right to  "privacy"-a
word  that  does  not appear  in  the  Constitution  at  all and  that  in
any  case  fails  to  come  to  grips  with  the  abortion  question.  To
oppose  the  abstract "right to  life"  to  the  equally  abstract  "right to
choose"  is  entirely  unhelpful.  As  many  people  have  suggested,  a
social  goal  might  be  not  to  protect  an  abstract  right  to  choose,
but instead  to develop methods  to  protect unborn life  while simul-
taneously providing  help  and support for mothers.'
If we  acknowledge  all  this,  how, if at  all,  might  the  abortion
right be justified?  The  answer has  everything  tq  do with social con-
text and  with failures  of social  responsibility.  Under  conditions  of
equality  on  the  basis  of sex  and without. widespread  poverty,  the
argument  for  an  abortion  right would  be  far  weaker."2  Surely  it
is correct  to  say that  in a society  in which  duties  to  the vulnerable
were  taken  seriously,  the  case  for  a  right  to  abortion  would  be
much  less  plausible  than  it  now  is.  In  such  a  society,  men  as  well
as  women  would  be  required  (by  social  norms  and  perhaps  by
110  See,  e.g.,  GLENDON,  supra note  1,  at 58-66,  164-68.
111  See,  e.g.,  MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  ABORTION  AND  DIVORCE  IN  WESTERN  LAW  (1987);
Michael  W.  McConnell,  Religion  and  the  Search for  a Principled Middle  Ground on  Abortion,
92  MICH.  L.  REv.  1893  (1994)  (reviewing  ELIZABETH  MENSCH  &  ALAN  FREEMAN,  THE  POLI-
TICS  OF  VIRTUE:  Is  ABORTION  DEBATABLE?  (1993)).
112  This  is  one  lesson  of  Glendon's  work,  though  it  is  not  a  lesson  that  Glendon
draws  herself.  See  GLENDON,  supra note  111.
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law)  to  devote  their bodies  to the  protection  of their children.  In
such  a  society,  women  who  need  help  would  get  help-before,
during, and after  pregnancy."  In  such  a society,  the  existence  of
social  assistance  would  argue  against  the  right  to  abortion,  by
making  child-bearing  and  child-rearing  less  difficult  and  less  a
source of inequality than it now  is for many women.
Most  important,  in  such  a  society  restrictions  on  abortion
would be  based on a  general  and neutral form  of compassion  for
the  vulnerable,  rather  than  the  now  pervasive  desire-prominent,
though  (I emphasize)  by no means universal,  in  the pro-life  move-
ment-to  control  women's  reproductive  capacities,  and  by means
of that control  to prescribe  traditional  gender  rules  through  law,
and  in  that  way  to  continue  a  system  of discrimination  that  is
based on sex.
I  have  described  a  society  in  which  any  right  to  abortion
might  seem  puzzling  or  even  unnecessary.  This  is  not, of course,
the  society in which  we  live.  If one  looks  at the  context  in which
restrictions  on  abortion  take  place-at  their  real  purposes  and
their  real effects-the  abortion  right is  most plausibly  rooted  not
in privacy but in  the right to equality on  the basis of sex. I  cannot
fully  support  the  claim  here," 4 but  a  few  points,  bearing  on  the
nature of rights claims  in general,  may be suggestive.
Current  law  does  not compel  men  to  devote  their  bodies  to
the protection  of other people, even  if life  is  at stake, and  even  if
men  are  responsible  for  the  very existence  of those  people.  Many
studies  have shown that current restrictions  on abortion  could  not
be  enacted  without  the  active  support  of  those  who  believe  that
such  restrictions  are  an  important  means of reasserting traditional
gender  roles."-  Of course  such  support  is  not  barred  by  any  le-
gitimate  theory of democracy,  but it suggests  that the relevant laws
are  in fact  founded  in  significant  part  (though  certainly  not  uni-
versally)  in  prejudice.  And  under  current  conditions, women  who
need  social  assistance  or  (at  least  equally  important)  help  from
fathers  do  not  get nearly  enough-not  merely  during  pregnancy,
but before  and after as well.
If this is  the  case,  the  very existence  of the abortion  right can
be  seen  as  a  response  to  a  failure  of  social  responsibility.  The
113  See id. at  53-58  (discussing  the  European  practice  of care  for pregnant  women).
114  See  SUNSrEJN,  supra  note  60,  at  270-85,  for  a  more  complete  discussion  of this
claim.
115  See,  e.g.,  KRISTEN  LUKER,  ABORTION  AND  THE  POLITICS  OF  MOTHERHOOD  (1984).
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right  cannot  be justified  in  the abstract-its  existence  owes  every-
thing  to  context.  In  this  lies  a  large  lesson.  Rights  often  emerge
precisely  because  of the  refusal  of  private  and public  institutions
to recognize  and  to  carry out their  duties. When  the  environment
is  badly  degraded,  when  the  most  vulnerable  people  are  left  to
fend  for  themselves,  or  when  children  are  at  risk,  it  should  be
unsurprising  to  find vigorous if apparently  odd  claims for "rights."
The  claims for a right to clean  air  and water,  to food,  to a decent
place  to  live,  to a  safe workplace,  to  children's  rights,  or  to "free
reproductive  choice'"-all  these  must be  understood  in  their  con-
text,  as responses  to failures  of social  responsibility.
Critics  of  rights  are  sometimes  persuasive  in  asserting  that
rights-based  arguments  can  obscure  the  problems  at  hand.  It  is
very  plausible  to  think  that vulnerable  people  should  not  have  a
legally enforceable  right to  freedom  from  everything  to which they
are vulnerable,  in  part because  such a right could impair responsi-
bility.  It  is  very  plausible  to  think  that  instead  of  emphasizing  a
right to  abortion,  we  should alter  the  social  conditions  that make
abortion attractive  or necessary. Arguments  on behalf of rights can
simplify  complex  issues,  beg important  questions,  and treat issues
involving  trade-offs  among  competing  goals  as  soluble  through
easy formulas.  But it would  be  unfortunate  if plausible  objections
to  rights-based  thinking  were  taken  as  a  reason  to  ignore  or  to
disparage  those  who  are  proclaiming  their  rights,  rather  than  to
improve  the  conditions  that  have  made  it  necessary for people  to
resort  to proclamations  of rights  in  the first place.
IV.  CONCLUSION
There  have  been many  different strands  in  recent  critiques  of
rights.  Some of those  strands  point to  legitimate  concerns.  We can
identify  rights claims that are  genuinely absurd, and it is important
to  acknowledge  that a society pervaded  by  rights may be pathologi-
cal.  My  basic  point here  is  that the  category of rights  is  extremely
broad  and  that for  this  reason,  no  general  critique  of  rights  will
make  much  sense.  Those  who  blame  "rights"  have  misdescribed
their  real  target.  In  the  last generation,  morever,  there  has  been
no  general  shift from  responsibilities  to  rights.  Instead  there  have
been multiple  particular  shifts  in both  directions.
Some  rights  are  a  precondition  for  social  interaction.  Rights
are  not opposed  to  responsibilities,  at least not in  any simple way;
rights  are responsibilities.  Rights  need not be associated  with  exces-
sive  self-interest  or  excessive  individualism.  The  real  question  is
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not  whether  we  should  have  rights,  but  what  rights  we  should
have.  Some  of what  I  have  discussed  here  bears on  that question,
but to make  much progress  on it, much  more  will have  to be said
about  both  values  and facts.  I  conclude  with  the  suggestion  that
we  should  cease  discussing -whether rights  are  desirable  and  cease
opposing  rights  to  responsibilities.  We  should  embark  instead  on
the  more  fine-grained  task  of  deciding  what  categories  of rights
are appropriate  in what  settings.NOTRE  DAME  LAW REVIEW
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